Abstract. We introduce a display calculus for the logic of Epistemic Actions and Knowledge (EAK) of Baltag-Moss-Solecki. This calculus is cut-free and complete w.r.t. the standard Hilbert-style presentation of EAK, of which it is a conservative extension, given that-as is common to display calculi-it is defined on an expanded language in which all logical operations have adjoints. The additional dynamic operators do not have an interpretation in the standard Kripke semantics of EAK, but do have a natural interpretation in the final coalgebra. This proof-theoretic motivation revives the interest in the global semantics for dynamic epistemic logics pursued among others by Baltag [4], Cîrstea and Sadrzadeh [8] .
Introduction
Dynamic logics form a large family of nonclassical logics, and perhaps the one enjoying the widest range of applications. Indeed, they are designed to formalize change caused by actions of diverse nature: updates on the memory state of a computer, displacements of moving robots in an environment, measurements in models of quantum physics, belief revisions, knowledge updates, etc. In each of these areas, formulas express properties of the model encoding the present state of a↵airs, as well as the preand post-conditions of a given action. Actions are semantically represented as transformations of one model into another, encoding the state of a↵airs after the action has taken place. Languages for dynamic logics are expansions of classical propositional logic with dynamic operators, parametrized with actions; dynamic operators are modalities interpreted in terms of the transformation of models corresponding to their action-parameters.
However, when dynamic logics feature both dynamic and 'static' modalities, as in the case of the Dynamic Epistemic Logics, they typically lose many desirable properties, such as the closure under uniform substitution. This and other di culties make their algebraic and proof-theoretic treatment not straightforward, and indeed, the existing proposals appeal to technical solutions which do not meet some of the requirements commonly sought for in proof-theoretic semantics [21, 22] . In [2] , a tableaux calculus is introduced, which is labelled, and restricted to the logic of Public Announcements (PAL); in [15] and [16] , sequent calculi are presented, covering truthful and arbitrary public announcements respectively, which are again labelled. In [5] and [9] , sequent calculi are defined, which are nested; these calculi are sound and complete w.r.t. a certain algebraic semantics which is more general than the standard Kripke semantics for the logic of Baltag-Moss-Solecki; they manipulate sequents whose succedents are unary, and in which three types of objects feature on a par (formulas, agents and actions); finally, two di↵erent entailment relations occur, for actions and propositions, respectively, which need to be brought together by means of rules of hybrid type.
In the present paper, we bring into focus that (at least one aspect of) the di culties hinted at above is the following. Whereas the interpretation of the adjoints of static modal operators is equally available in standard models and in the final coalgebra, this is no longer the case for dynamic modalities. In particular, Section 2 will emphasize that dynamic modalities do not in general come in adjoint pairs w.r.t. the standard Kripke semantics. In other words, display postulates (cf. Section 2) are not sound for dynamic modalities w.r.t. to the standard semantics. However, the soundness of these display postulates will be shown w.r.t. the final coalgebra semantics.
After reviewing dynamic epistemic logic (EAK) in Section 3, we define the Belnap's style display calculus D.EAK in Section 4. In Section 5, we outline the proofs that D.EAK is sound w.r.t. the final coalgebra semantics, complete w.r.t. the well known Hilbert-style presentation of EAK, and that the cut rule is eliminable. In Section 6 we briefly discuss why D.EAK is a conservative extension of EAK, and we outline some ongoing research directions. 
Coalgebraic semantics of dynamic logics
where f is the unique homomorphism M ! Z. This construction works essentially because, in the category of models/Kripke structures/coalgebras, homomorphisms (i.e. functional bisimulations) preserve the satisfaction/validity of modal formulas. Bisimulation invariance is also enjoyed by formulas of such dynamic logics as EAK (cf. Section 3). Hence, for these dynamic logics, both Kripke semantics and the final coalgebra semantics are equivalently available. However, so far the community has not warmed up to adopting the final coalgebra semantics for dynamic logic, Baltag's [4] , and Cîrstea and Sadrzadeh's [8] being among the few proposals exploring this setting. This is unlike the case of standard modal logic, in which the coalgebraic option has taken o↵, to the point that it has given rise to a field in its own right. In the present section, we o↵er new reasons to consider the final coalgebra semantics for dynamic logic; indeed, we bring to the fore one aspect in which the final coalgebra semantics for dynamic logics is more advantageous than the standard semantics. The interpretation of dynamic modalities is given in terms of the actions parametrizing them. Actions can be semantically represented as transformations of Kripke models, i.e., as relations between states of di↵erent Kripke models. From the viewpoint of the final coalgebra, any action symbol ↵ can then be interpreted as a binary relation ↵ Z on the final coalgebra Z. In this way, the following well known fact becomes immediately applicable to the final coalgebra model: 
These operators come in adjoint pairs:
Let
be the semantic modal operators given by Proposition 1 in the special case where X = Y is the carrier Z of Z; they respectively provide a natural interpretation in the final coalgebra Z for the four connectives h↵i,
, parametric in the action symbol ↵. As a direct consequence of the adjunctions (2), (3), the following display postulates, which are so crucial for the present work, are sound under this interpretation (cf. Section 5.1 for more details on this interpretation). Indeed, consider the model M represented on the right-hand side of the picture above; let the action ↵ be the public announcement (cf. [3] ) of the atomic proposition r, and let A := ⇤p and B := q; hence M ↵ is the submodel on the left-hand side of the picture.
M . This proves our claim.
The logic of epistemic actions and knowledge
In the present section, the relevant preliminaries on the syntax and semantics of the logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK) [3] will be given, which are di↵erent but equivalent to the original version [3] , and follow the presentation in [13, 17] . Let AtProp be a countable set of proposition letters. The set L of formulas A of (the single-agent 5 version of) the logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK) and the set Act(L) of the action structures ↵ over L are built simultaneously as follows:
Notice that ↵ denotes both the action structure and the accessibility relation of the action structure. Unless explicitly specified otherwise, occurrences of this symbol are to be interpreted contextually: for instance, in j↵k, the symbol ↵ denotes the relation; in M ↵ , the symbol ↵ denotes the action structure. Of course, in the multi-agent setting, each action structure comes equipped with a collection of accessibility relations indexed in the set of agents, and then the abuse of notation disappears.
Sometimes we will write Pre(↵) for Pre ↵ (k). Let ↵ i = (K, i, ↵, Pre ↵ ) for every action structure ↵ = (K, k, ↵, Pre ↵ ) and every i 2 K. Intuitively, the actions ↵ i for k↵i encode the uncertainty of the (unique) agent about the action that is actually taking place. The standard stipulations hold for the defined connectives >, ?,^, ! and $.
Models for EAK are relational structures M = (W, R, V) such that W is a nonempty set, R ✓ W ⇥W, and V : AtProp ! P(W) is a map. The evaluation of the static fragment of the language is standard. For every Kripke frame F = (W, R) and every ↵ ✓ K ⇥K, let the Kripke frame`↵ F := (`K W, R ⇥ ↵) be defined 6 as follows:`K W is the |K|-fold coproduct of W (which is set-isomorphic to W ⇥ K), and R ⇥ ↵ is the binary relation oǹ K W defined as (w, i)(R ⇥ ↵)(u, j) i↵ wRu and i↵ j.
For every model M = (W, R, V) and every action structure
be such that its underlying frame is defined as detailed above, and (`K V)(p) :=`K V(p) for every p 2 AtProp. Finally, the update of M with the action structure ↵ is the submodel
Given this preliminary definition, formulas of the form h↵iA are evaluated as follows:
Proposition 2 ( [3, Theorem 3.5]). EAK is axiomatized completely by the axioms and rules for the minimal normal modal logic K plus the following axioms:
. An immediate and well known consequence of the theorem above is that every Lformula is EAK-equivalent to some formula in the static fragment of L. This implies in particular that L-formulas are invariant under standard bisimulation, and this fact extends of course to the multi-agent version.
The representation of actions as action structures is just one possible approach. Here we prefer to keep a black-box perspective on actions, and to identify agents a with the indistinguishability relation they induce on actions; so, in the remainder of the paper, the role of the action-structures ↵ i for k↵i will be played by actions such that ↵a .
EAK displayed
In the present section, the display calculus D.EAK for the logic EAK (cf. section 3) is introduced piecewise: in the next subsection, display calculi will be presented which are multi-modal versions of display-style sequent calculi proposed in the literature for the (bi-)intuitionistic versions of basic and tense normal modal logic [11, 21] . This presentation is modular w.r.t. intuitionistic logic: namely, for the sake of a more straightforward extension to the intuitionistic counterparts of PAL and EAK [13, 17] , it takes the connectives in the language of IEAK as first-class citizens; the classical base is captured by adding the two Grishin rules (see below) to the system. In section 4.2, the rules for the dynamic connectives are introduced. The calculus D.EAK consists of all the rules in the two subsections. The language L(m-IK) of the multi-modal version of Fischer Servi's intuitionistic modal logic IK features one pair of modal connectives for each element a in a set A of agents, and consists of formulas built from a set of atomic propositions {p, q, r, . . .} and one constant ?, according to the following BNF grammar:
The language L(tm-IK) of the "tense-like" version of m-IK is obtained by expanding L(m-IK) with one pair of (adjoint) modalities _ a and ⌅ a , for each a in A.
The language L(btm-IK) of the bi-intuitionistic version of tm-IK is obtained by expanding the language of tm-IK with > and one extra propositional connective > , referred to as subtraction or disimplication, 7 which behaves as the dual intuitionistic implication. The reader is referred to [18] for an axiomatic presentation of bi-intuitionistic logic and to [11, 12] for its relative display calculi.
The static fragment
Display calculi typically involve sequents X`Y, where X and Y are structures, built from formulas A (in the present case, A 2 L(m-IK) (resp. L(tm-IK), L(btm-IK))) and the structural constant I by means of structural connectives (or proxies), according to the following BNF grammar 8 :
• a Structural symbols Connectives > !^_ > ?^a ⇤ a _ a ⌅ a Operational symbols moreover, structural connectives form adjoint pairs by definition (which will be witnessed in the ensuing display postulates), as follows:
The display calculi D.m-IK, D.tm-IK and D.btm-IK are defined by means of rules which are classified as structural and as operational rules. The structural rules below only concern structural connectives, and are common to the three of them (where the structures X ↵ and Y ↵ are dynamic-proxy-free):
The operational rules govern the introduction of the logical connectives: here below are the ones which are common to the three calculi:
Notice that, in the context of the full calculus, the variables X, Y, Z, W appearing in the rules in the present subsection are to be interpreted as structures of the full language of D.EAK, unless explicitly indicated otherwise with symbols such as X ↵ . 9 The weakening rules W L and W R are equivalent to the standard ones via the Display Postulates ⇣ ⌘ ; in these rules, the principal structure appears 'in display'; besides making an easier life in the proof of the cut elimination, we believe that this feature of W L and W R is more in line with the general design principles of display calculi. Notice also that the presence of the rules E L and E R makes it possible for us to dispense with the structural connective < and its relative rules, such as A ; B`C/A`C < B.
Here below, from the left to right, are the operational rules completing D.m-IK (1 st and 2 nd column), D.tm-IK (4 th and 5 th column), and D.btm-IK (3 rd column):
Finally, the classical versions of each of these calculi can be obtained from the above ones e.g. by adding the following Grishin's structural rules [12, 21] :
The dynamic fragment
The calculi introduced in the present subsection involve sequents X`Y, where X and Y are structures, built from formulas A 2 L(m-IEAK) (resp. L(tm-IEAK), L(btm-IEAK)) and the structural constant I according to the following BNF grammar:
Hence, the structural language above expands the one of the previous subsection with structural connectives {↵} and { ↵ } for each action ↵ 2 ; these are by definition adjoint to each other as follows: . As discussed in section 2, these new connectives have a natural interpretation in the final coalgebra, but not in the standard semantics.
The 
Here below are the pure operational rules:
A The contextual rules encode inferences which can be performed only in the presence of a given assumption (in the case at hand, the preconditions of the action parametrizing a dynamic proxy). Here below the contextual structural rules:
The swap-in rules are unary and should be read as follows: if the premise holds, then the conclusion holds relative to any action such that ↵a . The swap-out rules do not have a fixed arity; they have as many premises 10 as there are actions such that ↵a ; in the conclusion, the symbol ;
with n occurrences of Y, where n is the number of actions such that ↵a . Finally, the contextual operational rules:
5 Soundness, completeness and cut elimination
Soundness in the final coalgebra
In the present section, we outline the soundness of D.EAK w.r.t. the final coalgebra semantics. Structures will be translated into formulas, and formulas will be interpreted as subsets of the final coalgebra, as discussed in section 2. In order to translate structures as formulas, proxies need to be translated as logical connectives; to this e↵ect, any given occurrence of a proxy is translated as one or the other of its associated logical connectives, according to which side of the sequent the given occurrence can be displayed on as main connective [6, 21] , as reported in Table 1 . Sequents A`B will be interpreted as inclusions
As for rules not involving { ↵ } , we will rely on the following observation, which is based on the invariance of EAK-formulas under bisimulation (cf. Section 3): 
The following are equivalent for all EAK-formulas A and B:
boils down to the verification of inclusions which interpret validities of IEAK [13] , and hence, a fortiori, of EAK. Same arguments hold for the Grishin rules, except that their soundness boils down to classical but not intuitionistic validities.
Lemma 2. (Principle of indirect inequality) Tfae for any preorder P and all a, b 2 P:
(1) a  b; (2) x  a implies x  b for every x 2 P; (3) b  y implies a  y for every y 2 P.
As an example, let us verify s-out L : fix a model M, fix EAK-formulas A and B, and assume that for every action , if
By the principle of indirect inequality, it is enough to show that
M | ↵a }, which is true (cf. Proposition 2). Finally, the soundness of the rules which do involve
remains to be shown. The soundness of the display postulates immediately follows from Proposition 1. As an example, let us verify the soundness of
: translating the structures into formulas, and applying the principle of indirect inequality, it boils down to verifying that [[ 
Z , where A > B can be interpreted classically, i.e. as ¬A^B. The straightforward verification that this is an instance of a principle valid in every frame is left to the reader.
Completeness
For the completeness of D.EAK, it is enough to show that all the axioms of EAK are derivable in D.EAK. Due to space restrictions, here we only report on the derivations of h↵i^aA $ Pre(↵)^W{^ah iA | ↵a }. For ease of notation, we assume that the actions such that ↵a form the set
Cut-elimination
In the present subsection, we outline the proof of the cut eliminability of D.EAK following the original strategy devised by Gentzen (cf. [20] ). Without loss of generality, we consider a derivation ⇡ of the sequent X`Y in D.EAK which contains a unique application of Cut as the last rule (let us refer to this application as Cut ⇤ ), and we show that a derivation of the same sequent exists in which Cut is not applied. We proceed by induction on the set of tuples (⇢, ), ordered lexicographically, where ⇢ is the complexity of the cut formula in Cut ⇤ (the rank of Cut ⇤ ), and is the sum of the maximal lengths of branches in the subdeductions of the premises of Cut ⇤ (the degree of Cut ⇤ ). In the base case, Cut ⇤ can be directly eliminated by exhibiting a cut-free proof ⇡ 0 with the same conclusion. This is more in general the case when the cut formula is atomic.
The inductive step consists in transforming ⇡ into a derivation ⇡ 0 with the same conclusion and one or more applications of Cut with lower rank or with same rank but lower degree. The typical situation in the original Gentzen proof is that, when the cut formula is not atomic and is not principal 11 in at least one of the premises, the transformation involves one or more Cut-applications of same rank and lower degree than Cut ⇤ , whereas when the cut formula is not atomic and is principal in both premises, the transformation involves one or more Cut-applications of lower rank than Cut ⇤ , as illustrated, e.g., in the following transformation:
This regularity breaks down when the Cut-formula is principal in both premises and has been introduced by means of an application of either contextual rules reverse. In this case, such a simple transformation as the one above is not available, and we need to consider all the possible ways in which the proxy {↵} has been introduced in the subdeduction of each premise of Cut ⇤ . The proxy {↵} might have been introduced by h↵i L , atom R , balance, and Besides the cut-elimination, the results in the present paper can be summarized by the following chain of inclusions between consequence relations, where K is the class of standard Kripke models:
